

Peacebuilding as conflict management or political engineering?

● Iain Attack

Peacebuilding is multidimensional: it involves both post-settlement reconstruction and violence prevention. It includes positive peace (procedural justice) and negative peace (a cessation of violence). The process also involves conflict resolution, mediation and negotiation. Helping a society to rebuild and prevent violence recurring is a vital part of effective peacebuilding along with traditional development activities. In recent years, a major challenge to peacebuilding is the use of war as an instrument of foreign policy with the attempted marginalisation of multilateral bodies such as the UN and the transfer of Western values and institutions, in particular those linked to the liberal market state.

Introduction

Armed conflict has been a pervasive and apparently intractable problem in many developing countries and continues to be a major threat to their prospects for economic and social development. The central aim of peacebuilding is to provide countries emerging out of such conflicts with the skills and resources they require not only to rebuild but also to prevent the recurrence of political violence. Thus, effective peacebuilding

involves a combination of traditional development concerns with an understanding of the dynamics of social and political conflict as well as innovative non-violent responses to it.

Despite the relative success of post-settlement peacebuilding under UN auspices in Mozambique (and more recently, East Timor) its current prospects are perhaps much less promising. The main challenge to peacebuilding as a form of conflict management in the context of the current international situation is the resurrection of war as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy (in the form of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strikes) combined with the threat this poses to multilateralism, represented primarily by the UN. The level of involvement, or lack of involvement, of the international community in post-Taliban Afghanistan provides a stark contrast to the role of ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique), for example.

At a deeper level, some critics challenge the notion that peacebuilding is merely a form of international conflict management. Peacebuilding is also a mechanism for transmitting Western values and institutions from the so-called developed world to so-called developing or emerging countries, or from the core to the periphery.

In particular, peacebuilding involves the transmission of the Westphalian model¹ of the state to countries emerging from civil war or internal armed conflict. Attempts to establish such a state may have an ambiguous impact on the violence prevention component of peacebuilding in new or post-modern wars because the formation and control of the state is often the precise issue in dispute.

1. Peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era

Peacebuilding emerged as a popular concept through *An Agenda for Peace* in the early 1990s (1992), in the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War period and George Bush Senior's new world order, although Johan Galtung was already using the term some decades previously. Both Galtung and Boutros Boutros-Ghali discuss peacebuilding in connection with the related concepts and activities of peacemaking and peacekeeping.²

Boutros-Ghali referred to peacemaking as "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through...peaceful means".³ This can include various forms of mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution as well as more conventional forms of diplomacy.

Classic peacekeeping, conventionally associated with UN intervention in armed conflicts (pre-1990), involves the impartial imposition of the armed forces of uninvolved countries between warring or conflicting groups in order to preserve or protect whatever peace agreements or political settlements these groups have been able to achieve. Peacekeeping has also come to include the implementation of the immediate terms of such agreements under UN auspices, as in the case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique.

Peacebuilding, as the final phase or stage of these three basic components of a peace process, involves a combination of post-settlement reconstruction and violence prevention. Thus, Boutros-Ghali defines peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”.⁴

In other words, there is an assumption that all armed conflicts, no matter how protracted and apparently intractable, are both finite and resolvable through these processes of international conflict management. As George Mitchell said in an address to the Royal Irish Academy in November 2002, “there is no such thing as a conflict that cannot be ended—peace can ultimately prevail”. Conflicts are created by human beings and they can also be ended by human beings. There is also an assumption that armed conflict is not merely resolvable, but also preventable, and that conflict management can somehow replace or displace war and armed force as responses to political and social conflict.

It was thought that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, protracted local or regional conflict in, for example, Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala) and southern Africa (Mozambique, South Africa) could also be resolved. To some extent, this optimism was justified, with peace processes becoming entrenched and ending armed conflict in many of these regions or countries.

There were also numerous new, at least equally bitter and destructive conflicts in the 1990s however, such as Somalia, Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia, Chechnya, West Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, that perhaps represent failures or at least limits to this form of international conflict management. These are, perhaps, examples of what Mary Kaldor and others have referred to as new wars or post-modern wars, because they are largely internal or intra-state and because non-state actors play such a prominent role in them.⁵

The Canadian Church-based NGO (non-governmental organisation) Project Ploughshares has distinguished between three overlapping types of intrastate war: state control, state

formation, and state failure. “State control situations ...centre on struggles for control of the governing apparatus of the state....” (e.g. Colombia, West Africa, Mozambique in the 1980s). “State formation conflicts centre on the form or shape of the state itself and generally involve particular regions of a country fighting for a greater measure of autonomy or for outright secession” (e.g. Sri Lanka, East Timor). Finally, there are “failed state wars...in which the armed conflict is ...about local issues and disputes involving violence in the absence of effective government control” (e.g. Somalia in the 1990s). Furthermore, some countries such as Sudan “have the misfortune of hosting all three types of war”.⁶

2. Some basic characteristics of peacebuilding

Table I summarises some suggested characteristics of peacebuilding, organised thematically. The main distinctions concern the international, domestic as well as the so-called negative and positive peace components of peacebuilding.

The international dimension of peacebuilding is both institutional and normative. The institutional element stresses peacebuilding as a multilateral activity, with a strong role for the UN in particular. Kofi Annan, for his part, has reiterated the importance of peacebuilding and conflict prevention as central activities and responsibilities of the UN. In his June 2001 report *The Prevention of Armed Conflict*, for example, he states “conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁷

The normative element concerns the underlying values both implicit and explicit in peacebuilding, including a commitment to human rights, economic and social development and processes of democratisation. Furthermore, these values or norms are supposed to be universally relevant and applicable.

As mentioned, the domestic dimension of peacebuilding can be divided, at least for analytical purposes, into positive peace and negative peace elements, a distinction that Galtung utilised in his seminal article “Violence, peace and peace research”.⁸ Broadly speaking, positive peace refers to the elimination or alleviation of the underlying causes of war and armed conflict through initiating processes of peaceful social, economic and political change. As Boutros-Ghali suggests in *An Agenda for Peace* “the deepest causes of conflict include economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression”.⁹

Negative peace refers to the cessation of what Galtung refers to as direct or physical violence. It is in this sense that peace becomes the opposite, or the absence, of war or armed conflict.

Positive peace is also linked to broader conceptions of justice, both procedural and distributive, as providing the essential conditions for a peaceful society and preventing the recurrence of armed conflict. Negative peace, on the other hand, can be connected to security, or the removal of immediate threats to one's well-being and survival, bringing together these two elements, justice and security, of what we might mean more generally by peace.

Table 1: Some basic characteristics of peacebuilding

Adapted from an *Agenda for Peace*:

- Post-settlement reconstruction;
- Efforts towards violence prevention;

At the international level:

- Multilateral i.e. under the auspices of multilateral organisations, especially the UN;
- Reflecting a concern with international norms (sometimes embodied in international law) i.e. human rights, development;

At the domestic level (positive peace/justice):

- Involving or strengthening civil society (e.g. NGOs, grass roots organisations, Churches, trade unions), partly as a way of legitimising or gaining acceptance for peace agreements or peace processes—social;
- Democratisation, statebuilding, good governance (i.e. transparent, accountable, not corrupt), rule of law—political
- Economic development, poverty eradication, overcoming inequality—economic

At the domestic level (negative peace/security):

- Demobilisation of combatants;
- Disarmament through decommissioning or elimination of weapons;
- Demilitarisation both institutionally (e.g. through reform of the security forces); and also ideologically (peace education etc.).

Peacebuilding is also concerned with building or developing institutions and procedures for dealing with conflicts non-violently, or what Oliver Ramsbotham refers to as “confronting the challenge of ‘Clauswitz in reverse’”, so “that post-war politics is a continuation of the conflict albeit transmuted into non-military mode”.¹⁰ The aim of peacebuilding is not to end conflict, which is inevitable and can be a creative force for change in societies, but rather to ensure that such conflicts can be

handled without resorting to destructive physical violence.

As Charles Lerche suggests:

conflict among groups is really politics as usual, but when it takes an overtly violent form it indicates the political system can no longer contain this inevitable competition for material and non-material stakes. We should not, therefore, expect relations between any politically significant cleavage groups to be definitively transformed into a state of harmony.¹¹

Instead, they need to acquire the capacity and the institutions to deal with conflict non-violently, so that peacebuilding “should include the search for a model of governance and social relations that enables all groups in society to deal equitably and creatively with conflict.”¹²

This concern with peacebuilding as a form of conflict resolution or conflict transformation capacity-building is reflected in the recent definition provided by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC):

Peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence.¹³

While the international community can play a vital role in an immediate post-war situation, the ultimate objective of peacebuilding must be to develop or create or activate domestic or indigenous capacities for dealing with conflict non-violently.

Thus, we can say that the peace sought through post-settlement peacebuilding activities consists of three core elements or values: justice (distributive and procedural), security and non-violence. The first two concern desired outcomes of peacebuilding (positive and negative peace), while the third involves the methods by which these are to be achieved and sustained, reflected through a commitment to developing or utilising indigenous capacities for conflict resolution.

The CPCC has also produced a peacebuilding activities chart that provides an operational definition of peacebuilding divided into eleven categories, illustrating what the concept means in practice. This chart was produced as a result of a 1997 census of Canadian NGO peacebuilding activities, and complements the more analytical definition provided in Table 1.¹⁴ Catholic Relief Services has also produced a similar operational definition of

peacebuilding, based on its own field experience, in the form of sixteen categories of peacebuilding activities.¹⁵ Caritas Internationalis has also produced a resource called *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual*, to enhance the skills of those working in the area of peacebuilding.¹⁶

David Last and Oliver Ramsbotham have each provided detailed analytical definitions of peacebuilding in schematic form, which coincide more or less with the different aspects of the domestic dimension of peacebuilding outlined in Table 1. Last bases his analysis of peacebuilding requirements on the core peacebuilding tasks identified by the CPCC. Both Last and Ramsbotham also refer to another, psychological, dimension of peacebuilding, concerned with healing psychological wounds (Ramsbotham) or psycho-social trauma (Last), which they link to processes of reconciliation.¹⁷

Gender and peacebuilding

Gender is of course an important cross-cutting theme affecting all aspects of peacebuilding. The gender dimension of peacebuilding has been recognised by both the European Parliament and the UN Security Council (Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security).¹⁸ It has been suggested that conflict affects men and women differently precisely because of the different social roles assigned to them and relations of power between them. Thus, the gender and peacebuilding workshop at the recent International Conference towards Better Peace Building Practice suggested: “As gender is embedded in relations of power/powerlessness it is important that when understanding violent conflict it is viewed from a gender perspective.”¹⁹ And Lerche claims that it is “well documented that women, who do much of the essential work and domestic production in society, are most affected by widespread conflict.”²⁰

Such gender relations can also permeate efforts to emerge from and overcome violent conflict through peacebuilding. “The conventional wisdom is that men negotiate the peace while women build it.”²¹ These are merely some of the conventional gender roles that may need to be challenged by peacebuilding processes genuinely concerned with a commitment to its positive peace, or justice, component.

3. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Mozambique

ONUMOZ (the UN Operation in Mozambique) has been credited with “one of the most successful transitions from war to peace in recent times”.²² ONUMOZ is an example of “second generation” peacekeeping, with perhaps more in common with post-settlement peacebuilding, or active efforts to secure a sustainable peace, than with “classic” or “first generation” peacekeeping.

According to Aldo Ajello, the UN Secretary-General’s special representative in charge of ONUMOZ, the operation had four basic components: political, military, humanitarian and electoral.²³ The key element of the political component was the Supervision and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which replaced the government in all matters related to the implementation of the general peace agreement. The members of the CSC were the two main political parties (Frelimo and Renamo) and various international partners and it was chaired by the UN.

The military component consisted of both UN observers, responsible for monitoring the demobilisation process, for example and five infantry battalions to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and the return of refugees and displaced people. The humanitarian component was coordinated by the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator (UNOHAC). Its mandate was “to coordinate the humanitarian assistance of the UN organizations and, to the extent possible, of non-governmental organizations” to displaced people and returning refugees, for example.²⁴

“The electoral component was relatively small. Its mandate was simply to monitor and observe.” Organising the elections was the responsibility of the National Election Commission.²⁵

Perhaps the greatest achievement of ONUMOZ was the demobilisation and reintegration of 80,000 combatants from both sides of the civil war. A key reason for this success was financial, in the form of the reintegration support scheme (RSS). The RSS was an “*ad hoc* Trust Fund”, provided by the international donor community and administered by the UNDP (UN Development Programme), which provided 18 months’ wages to each soldier in addition to the 6 months’ wages from the government under the terms of the GPA.

According to Ajello, the RSS achieved two or perhaps three important results: “It prevented violence and banditry and hence helped to establish a peaceful environment in which the electoral campaign could take place”. Furthermore, it avoided what he

referred to as the Angola scenario, in which both sides were able to hold on to “a reserve of troops...as a safety net.” It “also had the side effect of reducing the number of soldiers interested in joining the new army”.²⁶

Thus, ONUMOZ was successful in terms of the negative peace objectives of peacebuilding in Mozambique, through bringing a definitive end to the civil war and achieving the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants. In terms of positive peace objectives, armed conflict has been replaced by political competition in the context of formal democratic structures, such as a federal parliament and regular elections. Economically, Mozambique has achieved high rates of growth but remains heavily dependent on foreign aid and constrained by debt and World Bank/International Monetary Fund conditionalities.

A vital ingredient of this positive peace component of peacebuilding in Mozambique was Frelimo’s prior forced conversion from state socialism to liberal market democracy. “The peacebuilding mission, in other words, reinforced and expedited a process of political and economic liberalisation which had been ongoing since the early 1980s.”²⁷

Ajello has suggested eight lessons “from the Mozambican experience”, which are summarised in Box 1. These emphasise the importance of a strong commitment to the process on the part of all groups involved in the conflict, as well as the importance of the international community more generally and the UN in particular.

Box 1: Eight lessons from the Mozambican experience²⁸

1. A strong will for peace on the part of all the parties involved in the conflict is an essential prerequisite for the success of a peacekeeping operation.
2. A solid peace agreement provides the essential basis for a successful peacekeeping operation.
3. A strong political structure should be established to manage the peace process.
4. The UN should be given an active political role in this structure as the engine of the process and not a passive role as an observer.
5. The international community should be an active player in the peace process.
6. The presentation and consolidation of peace should be the top priority in a peacekeeping operation.
7. Rules and procedures should be applied with the required flexibility.
8. The special representative of the UN Secretary-General must be carefully selected.

4. Challenges to peacebuilding post 11 September

Recent peacebuilding efforts under UN auspices, such as those in Mozambique and East Timor, have been relatively successful, to the extent that “the United Nations can justifiably claim that, if it is given support by the Security Council’s member governments, it has the tools and the experience to take on other nation-building tasks in the future.”²⁹ Despite the relative success of such post-settlement peacebuilding initiatives, however, its current prospects are perhaps much less hopeful or promising, for at least two reasons.

The first is the hostility to multilateralism generally and the UN more particularly, on the part of the current US administration, epitomised by Richard Perle’s infamous farewell to the UN during the recent war against Iraq. The second, related, reason is the revival of war as an instrument of foreign policy, undermining any commitment to international conflict management as an alternative to the use of military force, again by the current US administration (the Bush doctrine and pre-emptive strikes).

The level of involvement, or lack of involvement, of the international community in post-Taliban Afghanistan provides a stark contrast to the role of ONUMOZ and the UN in Mozambique, for example. In contrast to Mozambique (and East Timor), the UN has deliberately adopted a so-called light footprint approach to Afghanistan, epitomised perhaps by the role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF, which is under British command but has a Security Council mandate, is restricted to protecting Kabul, leaving the warlords free to operate in the rest of the country, outside the control of the central, transitional government. Mahmood Monshipouri, for example, describes the government’s “limited control over large parts of the country, due to the abilities of regional warlords and armed factions”, as “alarming”, from both a humanitarian and a peacebuilding perspective.³⁰

Similarly, the role of the UN in post-Saddam Iraq is currently in dispute, not least between the US and its ally Britain. The US wants to limit the UN to distributing humanitarian assistance and providing logistical or technical help with elections (when they occur), while Britain seeks a stronger role for the UN in the post-Saddam governance of the country. In this context, we must ask ourselves whether or not conflict prevention and peacebuilding can retain any relevance or promise as viable alternatives to war and armed conflict as apparently permanent features of international politics.

5. Peacebuilding as political engineering

Some friendly critics of peacebuilding, such as Roland Paris, suggest that we need to “challenge the conventional notion that peacebuilding is merely a technique for managing violence”,³¹ or a form of international conflict management. Paris argues that peacebuilding is actually a mechanism for transmitting Western values and institutions from the so-called developed world to so-called developing or emerging countries, giving rise to accusations of neo-colonialism. In particular, he writes that peacebuilding involves “the globalisation of a particular model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the core to the periphery of the international system”.³²

One need only look at some of the characteristics of peacebuilding itemised in Table 1 to find support for this assertion. The values of Western liberal states—multilateralism, rule of law, democracy, human rights, freedom—are at the heart of this approach and are indistinguishable from it. Also, Mozambique’s success as an example of peacebuilding through effective international conflict management under UN auspices depended on processes of political engineering initiated through a different set of multilateral institutions, that is, World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposed structural adjustment programmes.³³

Paris does acknowledge that in “contrast to the old colonialism, peacebuilding missions have normally been deployed for limited periods, at the request of local parties, with the approval of international organisations, and with the goal of establishing conditions for war-shattered states to govern themselves”.³⁴ According to these criteria, peacebuilding contrasts not merely with old colonialism but also with current forms of imperial hegemony. We can ask, for example, how many of these criteria are currently being met in Iraq.

Nonetheless, Paris claims that peacebuilding missions, in addition to promoting Western norms and institutions, “serve as vehicles for a particular type of globalisation”, the globalisation of a specific model of the state, “as political units with centralised administrations that exercise exclusive authority over a bounded territory, or what is sometimes called the ‘Westphalian state’”.³⁵

The form of globalisation associated with peacebuilding, then, includes not only the spread of liberal norms and institutions from the core of the international system to the periphery, but also the ongoing reproduction of the Westphalian state model.³⁶

However, attempts to establish such states may play an ambiguous role in the context of so-called new or post-modern wars, characterised as they are by disputes over state failure, state formation and state control. In other words, external efforts to establish a strong centralised state might exacerbate rather than alleviate or prevent social and political conflict in certain contexts. In such cases, it is the state itself that is in dispute, so that efforts to strengthen it merely augment a central feature of the armed conflict.

One can question the relevance of the Westphalian state to peacebuilding in Afghanistan, for example, given that historically it has always had a weak central state but a strong society or social networks. Wimmer and Schetter, for example, claim “for most Afghans the state represented an external entity, even a hostile one”. Effective state structures were restricted to a few urban centres, setting up an urban-rural divide that persisted into the twentieth century, during which these “centres, especially Kabul, developed into oases of state rule”. This urban-rural, state-local division was an important feature of the civil war that began in the late-1970s.³⁷

One consequence of this civil war, according to Wimmer and Schetter, is that even these “embryonic state structures...collapsed at all levels”, and it is in response to this chronic problem of state failure that they argue for statebuilding as a central component of reconstruction and peacebuilding in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In other words, in a situation characterised by warlordism, clientelism and the “dissolution of territorial integrity”, the appropriate response may be to focus on establishing a functioning state apparatus of some sort.³⁸ Thus, they suggest “alongside the alleviation of immediate poverty, establishing institutions that are able to perform the basic functions of modern states should represent the main strategic goal of the reconstruction programme” in Afghanistan.³⁹

To some extent, the difficulties associated with state-building reflect a tension between the two components of peacebuilding identified in *An Agenda for Peace*, post-settlement reconstruction (or positive peace) and violence prevention (or negative peace). State or institution building is an important element of post-settlement reconstruction, while conflict resolution capacities in the broadest sense are important for sustaining the cessation of armed conflict and maintaining the process of “Clausewitz in reverse”. In some contexts activities aimed at achieving positive peace, such as state- or nation-building, may undermine the conditions required for achieving negative peace, through

entrenching existing political divisions and disputes and preempting or preventing processes of dialogue, mediation, negotiation and so on.

Thus, a premature emphasis on the formal aspects of statebuilding in the form of multi-party elections and power-sharing arrangements, for example, may threaten or pre-empt efforts aimed at developing indigenous capacities or approaches to ending armed conflict. Paris claims, for instance, that in Rwanda “plans for political liberalization and democratic elections...contributed to the collapse of a fragile peace”, culminating ultimately in the genocide of 1994.⁴⁰ He argues, more generally, that international efforts to insert a particular model of the state and society, liberal market democracy, into war-affected countries “gave rise to unanticipated and destabilizing side effects in several of the states that hosted peacebuilding missions”.⁴¹

Thus, the danger associated with a narrow interpretation of statebuilding, from a peacebuilding perspective, is not only that it can represent an undue imposition of Western values and institutions but also that it can aggravate rather than ameliorate existing social and political tensions. From a peacebuilding perspective, political institutions are required that can manage the process of “Clausewitz in reverse”, whether or not these conform to Western ideals or the Westphalian model of the state. The process of statebuilding must be implemented in this broad sense, rather than as some Western import, if it is to contribute positively to post-war peacebuilding.

The underlying point is that peacebuilding must be understood as more than a technical exercise in international conflict management, which can be implemented with predictable success so long as sufficient resources and expertise are provided. Many of the values and norms implicit in peacebuilding as a multilateral enterprise are reflected in its focus on liberal market democracy as the model of state and society that provides the key to peace for war-torn countries, both domestically and internationally. A central objective of establishing political institutions as a component of peacebuilding, however, must be to support peaceful methods of dealing with social and political conflict based on indigenous capacities for conflict resolution, which may or may not conform to Western ideals or interests.

Conclusion

Peacebuilding is a multi-dimensional activity involving a combination of post-settlement reconstruction and violence prevention. As such, a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding will include a concern with positive peace, or distributive and procedural justice, and negative peace, or the cessation of armed threats to a population's well-being and survival, achieved by non-violent methods such as processes of conflict resolution, mediation, negotiation and so on.

In the post-Cold War era, the UN has played a leading role in some relatively successful instances of peacebuilding, in Mozambique and East Timor for example, indicating the viability of such initiatives as a form of international assistance to countries emerging out of armed conflict. Recent changes in US foreign policy, however, in the wake of the events of 11 September 2001 provide a serious challenge to peacebuilding as an effective multilateral instrument. It remains to be seen whether such foreign policy becomes entrenched following the US presidential elections in 2004. At a more profound level, peacebuilding may be a vehicle for the globalisation of certain values and institutions, especially those associated with the liberal market state. This emphasis on statebuilding must not be allowed to undermine other crucial aspects of peacebuilding, converting it into a process of externally-imposed political engineering masquerading as a technical exercise in international conflict management.

Footnotes

- ¹ The Westphalian model refers to the nation state as the sovereign political entity exercising centralised authority over a clearly defined geographical territory.
- ² See Johan Galtung (1975), "Three approaches to peace: peackeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding" in Johan Galtung, *Peace, War and Defence—Essays in Peace Research*, vol.2, Christian Ejlertsen, Copenhagen, pp.282-304.
- ³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1999), *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, New York, p.11
- ⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵ For example, see Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA.
- ⁶ Project Ploughshares (1997), *Armed Conflicts Report 1997*, Waterloo, Ontario, pp.4, 6
- ⁷ Kofi Annan (2001), Executive Summary, *Report of the Secretary-General: Prevention of Armed Conflict*, 7 June (A/55/985—S/2002/574), p.3
- ⁸ Johan Galtung (1969), "Violence, peace and peace research", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.6, no.3, pp.616-28

- ⁹ As cited in Sorpong Peu (2002), "The UN, peacekeeping and collective human security: from *An Agenda for Peace* to the Brahimi Report" in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), *Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development*, Frank Cass, London, p.53
- ¹⁰ Oliver Ramsbotham (2000), "Reflections on UN post-settlement peacebuilding" in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (eds), *Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution*, Frank Cass, London, p.171
- ¹¹ Charles Lerche (2000), "Peace building through reconciliation", *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol.5, no.2, Autumn/Winter, p.66
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p.74
- ¹³ Michael Small (2001), "Peacebuilding in postconflict societies" in Rob McRae and Don Hubert (eds), *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal and Kingston, p.78
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.78-80
- ¹⁵ Catholic Relief Services, "Sixteen categories of peacebuilding activities" in Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren (eds), *Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid and Conflict*, European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, pp.183-87. See also Caritas Internationalis (2002), *Peacebuilding: A Caritas Training Manual*, Vatican City.
- ¹⁶ See Caritas Internationalis (2002), *op.cit.*
- ¹⁷ Oliver Ramsbotham (2000), *op.cit.*, p.182; David Last, "Organizing for effective peacebuilding" in Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham (2000), *op.cit.*, p.86
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.223
- ¹⁹ International Conference towards Better Peace Building Practice, Annex 3: "Gender and peacebuilding" in Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren (eds, 2002), *op.cit.*, p.220
- ²⁰ Charles Lerche (2000), *op.cit.*, p.71
- ²¹ International Conference towards Better Peace Building Practice, 2002, *op.cit.*, p.221
- ²² Aldo Ajello (2001), "Mozambique: implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC, p.615
- ²³ *Ibid.*, p.621
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.622
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.631
- ²⁷ Roland Paris (2002), "International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'", *Review of International Studies*, no.28, p.649
- ²⁸ Ajello (1999), *op.cit.*, pp.640-41
- ²⁹ Jonathan Steele, "Nation building in East Timor", *World Policy Journal*, Summer 2002, vol.XIX, no.2, p.86
- ³⁰ Mahmood Monshipouri (2003), "NGOs and peacebuilding in Afghanistan", *International Peacekeeping*, vol.10, no.1, Spring, pp.142-3
- ³¹ Roland Paris (2002), *op.cit.*, p.655
- ³² *Ibid.*, p.638
- ³³ *Ibid.*, pp.648-9
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.652

- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.654
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.655
- ³⁷ Andreas Wimmer and Conrad Schetter (2003), "Putting state-formation first: some recommendations for reconstruction and peace-making in Afghanistan", *Journal of International Development*, vol.15, p.528
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.528 ff.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.534
- ⁴⁰ Roland Paris (2000), "Wilson's ghost: the faulty assumptions of postconflict peacebuilding" in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (2001), *op.cit.* p.768
- ⁴¹ Roland Paris (2000), *op.cit.*, p.766