

The US “war on terror” in Africa:

A discussion of the security-development nexus

● Selina Donnelly

This article considers the implications for Africa of an increasing US security focus on that continent, deriving particularly from US strategic interests in African oil. The author begins with an outline of the security-development nexus, relating it to US perceptions of the potential threat posed by the instability and underdevelopment of many African states. She then considers the characteristics of those states which influence US perceptions of a potential terrorist threat. The final section analyses the reality of such threats, the implications for African development of US counterterrorist measures and concludes that the Bush administration is attempting to link its war on terror and poverty relief measures to the promotion of neo-liberal economic policies.

Introduction

“Africa is vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism and important in our efforts to counter that menace.”

Testimony of Karl Wycoff, Office of the US Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2004

“Terrorism is not a major security concern in Africa. Threats caused by other problems are much more evident in the everyday life of ordinary people.”

Kivimaki (2003) p.23

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and in the context of concerns that certain African states may provide a fertile breeding ground for radical Islamic terrorism, the attentions of the US have been firmly refocused upon the continent, which has emerged as a “key new front in the War on Terror”.¹ Additional stimulation of US interest in Africa stems from the strategic importance the US attaches to securing access to African oil.² Such priorities increasingly feature not only in the security and foreign policy discourses of the US, but in the formulation of its overseas development assistance (ODA) strategies. Whilst the humanitarian considerations for pursuing the latter are still stressed by the US administration, poverty reduction is not presented as an end in its own right. In President Bush’s much cited speech to the UN International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002, he introduced the US Millennium Challenge Account as a novel approach to reducing poverty in developing countries, and warranted it with reference to the war on terror (WoT), claiming: “We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror”.³

Post 11 September the trend for US development policy and foreign aid to be used strategically to advance broader US foreign policy goals has prompted a wider debate about a securitising of the development agenda and the potential consequences of this for development schemes.⁴ Those who construe such trends positively stress that a stronger link between security and development attaches to the latter a sense of urgency and elevates the priority accorded to development objectives by important international actors. Divergent views warn of the dangers inherent in such a securitisation of development, claiming that it encourages a tendency for the security of the global North to become the central guiding principle for development in the South, a process that often damages the prospects of achieving either.⁵

A more specific assessment of the implications of renewed US interest and involvement in African counterterrorism and development initiatives as instruments of the WoT necessitates a consideration of a wide range of issues. Firstly, it is useful to outline in introductory terms the features of what has been labelled the security-development nexus – before relating these to US perceptions and prescriptions for countering the potential terrorist threat posed to its interests by African instability and underdevelopment. The second section of the paper will discuss in more detail those characteristics of African states which inform US perceptions of Africa as “vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism” both within its security and development discourses – focusing in the main on prior radical Islamic terrorist activity, alleged links between poverty and terrorism, and assertions that “weak or failing states provide havens, recruiting grounds, and transit opportunities for terrorist groups”.⁶

Subsequently, in the third section of the paper it is essential to pose the question how real are such threats, and to assess critically the implications for Africa of the US initiatives undertaken to address said threats. This involves examining in more detail how US counterterrorism measures and also ODA to Africa have been shaped by the perceived imperatives of the WoT. The concluding discussion evidences the importance attached to military capacity building within the US WoT in Africa, and argues that the Bush administration has sought to wed its WoT and the fights against terrorism and poverty to the promotion of neo-liberal economic policies.

1. Contours of the debate surrounding the security-development nexus

The security-development nexus – a brief introduction

Whilst the term “security-development nexus” was initially coined to express the need to improve understanding of the conceptual basis for linking security and development strategies in processes of conflict management, in its more general and recent application, it has been the moniker advanced to depict “the interlinking of international development policy with security concerns”.⁷ The incorporation of security concerns in development thinking is not a new phenomenon, particularly with respect to the US approach. Nonetheless, it may be argued

that the new security agenda following 11 September, and particularly the US trademarked WoT has reinvigorated some of the dynamics of ODA typical of the Cold War period, when a majority of US international development objectives took place within a specific security paradigm.⁸

The reorientation toward development as an instrument in achieving security has become particularly noticeable at a discursive level in the global North and is often founded on the premise that the merging of development and security agendas is somewhat inevitable in the context of globalisation, and is mutually beneficial to donors and recipients. In the case of the US position, Bush expresses such premises thus: “In an era of global trade and global terror, the futures of the developed world and the developing world are closely linked. We benefit from each other’s success. We’re not immune from each other’s troubles. We share the same threats; and we share the same goal – to forge a future of more openness, trade and freedom.”⁹

The US national security strategy, USAID and Africa

“In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States —preserving human dignity — and our strategic priority: combating global terror.”

President Bush remarks on US Policy toward Africa, May 2006

The trend toward foreign assistance constituting a key instrument of foreign policy is explicitly acknowledged in a recent USAID publication *Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through Development*, which “affirms that we will seek to use bilateral foreign assistance to build toward a safer and more secure, democratic, and prosperous world to enhance our own national security”.¹⁰ In particular, it is the threat of a “terrorist infestation” in Africa and the peril this would pose to American interests in the region that has resuscitated US interest in African development.¹¹

The mobilising discourses surrounding the WoT have been used to promote a confluence in objectives of the State Department and USAID, as regards their stated commitments to safeguard US national security – a trend which also suggests the combined employment of “hard” and “soft” powers in the pursuance of those objectives. The important questions for the purposes of this analysis is which of these instruments, if either, takes precedence in the US WoT with respect to Africa, and what are the consequent implications for African development? An

overview of specific US initiatives and their impact upon developmental processes within Africa will be examined in greater detail in the third section of the paper. Prior to this it is important to outline those attributes of African states which inform US perceptions of Africa, in the parlance of the Bush administration as being “the soft underbelly for global terrorism”.¹²

2. US appraisals of Africa as “vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism”

Radical Islamic terrorist activity in Africa

“The threat of terror to US interests in Africa is concrete, rising, and discernible. The probability of another attack on Americans on African soil is high.”

Kansteiner and Morrison (2004), p.76

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001 the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have been described as an earlier wake-up call to the US of the threat posed by Islamic radical terrorist networks linked to al-Qaeda within Africa.¹³ The US considers that a subsequent attack in Mombasa, Kenya in 2002 suggests that terrorist cells continued to be active in the region. In reports from the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) the Horn of Africa is prioritised on the basis of claims that, “al-Qaeda operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continue to pose the most serious threat to American and allied interests”.¹⁴ Sudan’s history of having played host to Osama bin Laden in the 1990s appears to continue to weigh heavily on US assessments of the international terrorist threat it presents. However, its evaluations are somewhat ambivalent and confusing as the report simultaneously maintains that Sudan continues to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror, yet classifies it along with Iran, and North Korea as a “state sponsor of terror, a country that provides critical support to non-state terrorist groups”.¹⁵

Concerns about North Africa and the western Sahara-Sahelian region were expressed in the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan, as US Major Jeff Kohler calculated that “As terrorist cells were uprooted from Afghanistan and elsewhere by US Central Command...they shifted to...the wide-open, relatively desolate areas of Africa...an easy back door to Europe through Algeria,

Morocco and Tunisia.”¹⁶ The US considers an Algerian terrorist group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), poses a sizeable threat, claiming it has links to al-Qaeda and has attempted to enlist and train adherents from among neighbouring Sahelian states.¹⁷ Nigeria, as home to Africa’s largest Muslim population, has also crucially figured in US concerns about the potential for the emergence of a more fundamentalist brand of Islam to reassert itself in the North, particularly given the priority accorded to securing access to Nigerian oil, which provides 10% of US supply.¹⁸

Representations of Africa as a breeding ground and safe haven of international terrorism

“We will challenge poverty and despair and lack of education and failed governments who too often create the necessary conditions that the terrorists take advantage of.”

President George W. Bush address to UN International Conference on Financing for Development, 22 March 2002¹⁹

Although cautious not to draw a simple correlation between poverty and terrorism, the US increasingly considers that the higher the poverty rates, the more propitious the environment to breed terrorism – even if analyses and field studies have contested such premises.²⁰ The US, in what it considers to be a response to appeals to include within its WoT, strategies which attempt to address the root causes of terrorism, has highlighted the importance of poverty reduction, employing the linkages conceived of within the security-development-nexus. That is, if development and security go hand in hand, on the flipside, underdevelopment invites global insecurity. Africa’s human development indicators are the lowest of any region and as such the continent has been identified by the US as susceptible to generating or hosting transnational terrorist organisations.²¹

The US has expressed concern about the radicalising potential that adverse socio-economic conditions may have on Africa’s 300 million Muslims, particularly in countries with strong links to the Middle East, and financial flows into Africa from that region designed to fund the emergence of more “intolerant” forms of Islam.²² Lyman et al. point to a recent analysis of foreign jihadists in Iraq, which estimates that 25% originated in Africa, perhaps suggesting that, whilst the “with us or against us” ultimatum issued by Bush in the aftermath of 11 September may have encouraged a majority of African states to at least nominally situate themselves in the former category, this has not necessarily been true of their citizens.²³ The NCTC report claims that many African governments have cooperated with the US and

strengthened their efforts in the war on terrorism, but also alleges that anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric from Islamic radicals in Africa has grown.²⁴

Weak, “failed” and conflict-prone states

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.1

The perception that African countries with weak governments, failing economies or ongoing conflicts may become safe havens and fertile breeding grounds for terrorists has been an influential shaper of US threat assessment with respect to the region.²⁵ Weak states are considered to appeal to international terrorist organisations for the combination of benefits they offer: conflict experience, settings for training and indoctrination, access to weapons and equipment, financial resources, staging grounds and transit zones, targets for operations and pools of recruits.²⁶ An analysis of the 11 September Commission report by the Congressional Research Service warns that the international terror threat against the US and local interests is likely to continue to grow in several parts of Africa because of political instability and a lack of state resources and capacities.²⁷ Again Somalia is referenced in US assessments that its “lack of central government, protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula make it a potential location for international terrorists seeking transit or launching point to conduct operations elsewhere.”²⁸

3. What are the implications for Africa of US initiatives guided by the “war on terror”?

Having firstly outlined in introductory terms the mobilising discourses of the US WoT and their relation to the security-development nexus, and secondly related these more specifically to US perceptions of the threat posed by African vulnerability to international terrorism – it is essential to discuss in more detail US initiatives within Africa, both in the projection of “hard” and “soft” powers, and to assess their implications for African development.

An overview of key US counterterrorism initiatives in Africa

“Together with our allies and friends, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.”

President Bush discusses his national security strategy for Africa, 11 July 2003

Given that the chief threat within Africa has been identified by the US as stemming from Eastern Africa, the principal US counterterrorism initiative has focused on this region with the establishment in 2002 of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA) to combat terrorism in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen. CJTF-HOA is headquartered in Djibouti, and staffed by approximately 2,000 military personnel.²⁹ President Bush announced \$100 million to fund a complementary East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) in June 2003, a programme designed to strengthen the counterterrorism capabilities of partner governments in the region, inclusive of provision of military training for border, coastal and aviation security.³⁰

Claims that the activities of the Algerian terrorist group, the GSPC, were spilling over into the neighbouring Sahel were cited by the US as justification for the Pan-Sahel Initiative of 2004, a \$7.75 million military training programme to assist these countries with their counterterrorism programmes.³¹ In 2005 the US extended the remit of its WoT even further by launching the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative, a five-year \$500 million programme, to build North and sub-Saharan African capacities to patrol borders, intercept armed groups and cooperate intraregionally (including Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, Niger and Mauritania). The US has established additional ties to Ghana, Uganda, Namibia and South Africa involving the upgrade of ports and airfields, prepositioning of fuel and other critical supplies, and access agreements that permit swift deployment of US forces for “counterterror purposes”.³² The decision to create a new Pentagon command in Africa, to be named AFRICOM, revealed by the US in February 2007 provides the most recent evidence of the US preoccupation with military expansion on the continent.

Criticisms of the employment of hard power in the US WoT in Africa

From the core examples of US counterterrorism initiatives sampled above, it becomes clear that in US thinking, combating terrorism within Africa is best achieved through reinforcing the military institutions of its states, where their capacity is not considered sufficient to police terrorist activity. Criticisms of the US approach focus on this disproportionate reliance on military measures. Lyman et al. propose that US “antiterrorism programs in Africa have been primarily military in nature without adequate political oversight or complementary political, public diplomacy or economic programs”.³³ Further, Booker and Colgan argue that what is now unfolding is the most significant US military engagement in Africa since 25,000 troops went to Somalia in 1992. They argue that this ongoing expansion of US military assets and interests in Africa reflects a growing bias toward African militaries as the key institutions through which to promote security in the region, a security defined differently from that presently preoccupying most African citizens.³⁴

Through training and basing rights such initiatives ensure a US military presence between oil-rich North and West Africa and facilitates what Carmody refers to as “encirclement of Islamic Africa”. This has resonance with Ukeje’s claim that securitisation, as a consequence of the US WoT, is driving policies of containment and promoting a strange version of trusteeship-style responsibility tying different parts of the continent to “quarantine disorder”.³⁵ The increased emphasis on hard military security may result in further “arms pollution” in Africa, reinforcing a previous trend towards remilitarisation within the continent already in progress prior to 11 September. The appropriateness of current US counterterrorism initiatives has also been challenged on the basis of the potential for threat exaggeration to justify these expansive countermeasures and also in relation to charges that US strategic interest in Africa’s oil is primarily guiding US actions at the expense of the welfare of African citizens. Debate rages in Africa as to how much of a true threat radical Islam poses and to what degree it has established enduring domestic roots. According to Lyman et al. that debate becomes entangled in (and sometimes distorted by) widespread skepticism regarding US intentions.³⁶

Considering US counterterrorism imperatives in the context of Western Africa

As the level of the imputed threat from terrorism is intimately connected with the political justifications for counterterrorism measures, it has been pointed out that post 11 September, the threat posed has often been magnified in the political discourses surrounding the new terrorism³⁷ to rationalise the extension of countermeasures. As such it can be difficult to separate the political rhetoric of the WoT from more “realistic threat assessments”.³⁸

In this vein Keenan claims that the justifications provided by the US for the launch of its Saharan-Sahelian front in the global WoT were based on massive exaggeration, even fabrication of GSPC terrorist incidents “designed primarily to create the ideological conditions for the expansion of US imperialist interests in Africa, notably the securing of US strategic natural resources”.³⁹ Amongst the detrimental consequences for development in the region cited by Keenan, is the damage inflicted upon the tourist industry, one of the main sources of livelihood for the indigenous Tuareg in southern Algeria and northern Niger. US branding of the Sahara-Sahel as a terrorism zone has all but closed the region to tourism since 2003 and has fuelled a source of great anger and anti-Americanism in the region. As a result Keenan proclaims that the political dynamics instigated by the US-Algerian WoT may already be showing signs of a self-fulfilled prophecy in achieving its original objective of transforming the Sahara-Sahel into a terrorist zone.⁴⁰

As implied, threat exaggeration may be used by either the US or its regional partner (or sometimes both) to extend their power base – a trend that has been noted by Ellis who makes reference to the comparative dynamics evidenced during the Cold War, noting: “The emphasis being given to the war on terrorism in West Africa and the Sahara is clearly creating the possibility for rent-seeking. Just as African governments during the Cold War could bid for US financial, military and diplomatic support by depicting themselves as under siege from Marxists, so they can now do the same by claiming that their enemies are radical Islamists”.⁴¹ Such realisations also feature in Lyman et al.’s criticisms that US “initiatives fail to consider how to mitigate the risk that host governments will be tempted to use the relationship that develops from an emerging security alliance with the US as an excuse for egregious misrule”.⁴²

Events in Mauritania provide a sobering example of the hazard of the WoT in the region. The deposed President Ely Ould

Mohamed Taya exploited his allegiance with the US to distract from internal problems, indulge in “spectacular corruption,” imprison opposition rivals whom he had conveniently branded Islamic extremists, and rig elections. However, one of the most lethal manifestations of US counterterrorism objectives in Africa is evidenced in the ambivalent relationship of the US with Sudan. On the one hand the Bush administration accuses Khartoum of genocide in Darfur. Yet on the other hand, the US has forged a strategic alliance with the Sudanese Mukhabarat (intelligence services) and is anxious to maintain this intelligence-sharing relationship in the context of its WoT.⁴³

Oil – a strategic priority and a source of conflict

“It used to be a kind of cruel joke twenty years ago when some of us tried to pretend Africa might rise to the level of strategic interest, but thanks to the oil deposits we’re finding every day in and near Africa, I can say with a straight face 30% of our oil will come from there, and I promise you it is a strategic interest.”

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Charles Snyder, 13 April 2004

The fact that the globalised economy is tied to territorially fixed resource extraction has prompted a more aggressive US military posture within Africa.⁴⁴ Some in the US foreign policy establishment argue for a “geo-political shift in US energy policy”, replacing the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Guinea as America’s main foreign spigot for oil. US strategists are already linking incursions by Chinese oil companies into Africa and growing Chinese oil imports to China’s growing military might, and speculating about what this portends for US oil interests in Africa and for US national security in a global context. Obi proposes that “a critical spin-off of these trends is the rapid securitization of West Africa’s development (protecting the market by military means) in the contexts of the US energy security interests and the incorporation of Africa into the global war on terror”.⁴⁵

The US is particularly anxious about Nigeria, whom it considers a regional strategic partner, producing 10% of US oil imports.⁴⁶ However, a failure by the US to fully recognise or accept the implications that Africa’s oil wealth is itself a source of violent conflict and instability, is likely to aggravate the situation further and make US operators’ easy targets in local battles. Recent headlines remind us that the long-standing turmoil surrounding oil extraction in Africa continues unabated. Hostage

taking and takeovers of oil platforms in the Niger Delta are becoming routine and are increasingly the defining strategy for marginalised communities demanding justice and economic compensation from foreign oil companies and the Nigerian government.⁴⁷

An overview of US development initiatives as a component of the WoT

Since 2002, the US has adopted a number of key policy initiatives within the soft power facet of the US WoT in Africa. Both the Millennium Challenge Account and the African Growth and Opportunity Act are rhetorically informed by the logic of a security-development nexus.

The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

At the UN International Conference for Financing Development in March 2002 President Bush outlined a plan for directing a portion of US development assistance to least developed countries on the basis of three central criteria: ruling justly, investing in people and economic freedom.⁴⁸ The MCA was presented as a novel approach which makes countries eligible for grants according to results achieved by the recipient governments, on the basis of 16 strict indicators to assess their policy performance ranging from civil liberties to days to start a business. Since its inception, the Millennium Challenge Corporation which administers the MCA has signed compacts worth \$1.5 billion with five countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Madagascar, Cape Verde, Benin, Ghana and Mali. The most recent OECD DAC Peer Review welcomes the MCA initiative as one that offers an important opportunity to improve the allocation and delivery of US ODA. However, the review also asserts that it is too early to assess the merits of the MCA as regards its impact in reducing poverty in recipient countries, making the qualification that “thus far the MCC mandate of ‘poverty reduction through growth’ remains to be demonstrated.”⁴⁹

Soederberg argues that while the MCA approach may appear novel, it shares an essential feature of preceding US development agendas which have had limited success: i.e. an unwavering commitment to the belief that the path to increased growth and prosperity lies in developing countries’ willingness and ability to adopt policies that promote economic freedom.⁵⁰ A number of US development agencies have been critical of the choice of MCA performance criteria, expressing fears that the main point

of the market-liberal acid tests set out under the policy area of economic freedom may be to serve as leverage to assert US trade interests.⁵¹ In an earlier critique Radlet points out that the US administration has not developed comparable strategies for countries that fail to qualify for MCA funding, whether they just miss qualifying or are “failed states” mired in perpetual conflict. Thus, the MCA falls far short of the goal of effectively assisting African countries struggling with poverty, global inequality and conflict. Moreover, the potentially positive impacts and broader foreign aid programmes are diminished by other US policies that undermine growth and development in many sub-Saharan African countries, particularly inequitable global trading structures and agricultural subsidies.⁵²

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

Cognisant of the above criticisms regarding its trading patterns, the US designed the AGOA to increase economic linkages with Africa and it has had some beneficial results for African development, with estimates that it contributed to the creation of some 200,000 new jobs in the continent. Yet claims that figures indicating exports to the US from Africa under AGOA almost doubled between 2002 and 2004 represent broad progress are somewhat misleading, as this dramatic rise was largely due to the fact that Angola and its oil became AGOA eligible during this period.⁵³ According to the latest trade statistics oil imports account for more than 70% of all US imports from Africa.⁵⁴

The Commission for Africa has also noted that the extension of security measures under the WoT also has implications for US-Africa trade. It recognises that “The introduction of new US security measures to combat terrorism at ports, may lead to further marginalization of developing countries. Given that 13 per cent of African trade constitutes exports to the US, the new measures are expected to reduce African exports by further increasing the region’s high cost of international trade. Security concerns could act as a non-tariff barrier and could undermine the benefits from preferential schemes such as the AGOA.”⁵⁵

The impact of the US WoT on ODA

“From the perspective of a broader conception of human security, there is a danger that the war on terrorism could sideline the struggle against poverty, health epidemics and other challenges, drawing scarce financial resources away from the causes of insecurity.... There remains a very real threat that already limited development assistance budgets could be

re-allocated to reflect the perceived imperative of military and foreign policy goals.”

UNDP *Human Development Report 2005*, p. 169

One of the most frequently expressed sources of unease in the development field as regards the potential impact of the US WoT on African development is that it diverts important resources away from aid objectives. There has been considerable interest in examining US ODA trends since 11 September to establish whether this has been the case, but little consensus on how these figures have been interpreted and according to Howell “the tighter overlap between military and development activities has complicated the reporting of aid statistics”.⁵⁶ A linear regression study conducted by the Centre for Global Development has been cited as evidence to dispel the widely-held belief that the US global war on terror (GWOT) has fundamentally altered US foreign aid programmes by shifting the focus to front-line GWOT countries in the Middle-East – claiming that, “concerns that there is a large and systematic diversion of US foreign aid from fighting poverty to fighting the GWOT do not appear to have been realized”.⁵⁷

Whilst the study found that increases in USAID assistance following 11 September were in the main accounted for by reconstruction and debt relief in Afghanistan and Iraq, it argued that there had not been any negative fundamental shift in USAID allocation to African countries that would undermine the “war on poverty”.⁵⁸ However, an examination of the most recent statistics provided by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) show that US ODA reached a record high of \$27.6 billion in 2005, but also indicate that Africa’s share of this figure relative to other regions is falling, particularly in comparison with the Middle East, which is prioritised above Africa in the global WoT (see Figure 1).

The militarisation of US bilateral aid means that African countries receive US assistance with a heavy counterterrorism focus. This is likely to continue in light of findings by the DAC Peer Review of US ODA which indicates that there has been a continued redirection of ODA away from USAID. The latter was responsible for the management of 38.8% of total ODA in 2005 (down from 50.2% in 2002). A primary factor in this decline was the rapid increase in ODA disbursements managed by the US Department of Defense (21.7% in 2005 versus 5.6% in 2002) consistent with a growing budget trend in support of global security interests. DAC cautioned that the consistently reduced

Figure 1. Review of the development co-operation policies and programmes of the United States Source: OECD (2006)

United States	Constant 2004 US\$ million					Per cent share					Total DAC	
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2004%	2004%
Africa	2347	3604	5492	4447	4769	31	38	38	33	22	41	41
Sub-Saharan Africa	1472	2497	4815	3517	4167	20	27	33	26	19	34	34
North Africa	876	1106	677	930	601	12	12	5	7	3	5	5
Asia	2017	2327	3144	2384	3331	27	25	22	18	15	29	29
South and Central Asia	1547	1576	2545	1863	2685	21	17	18	14	12	13	13
Far East	352	664	595	518	630	5	7	4	4	3	16	16
America	1954	1594	2170	2080	1534	26	17	15	15	7	13	13
North and Central America	864	650	646	679	766	12	7	4	5	4	6	6
South America	790	822	1391	1234	669	11	9	10	9	3	7	7
Middle East	352	526	2842	3760	11131	5	6	20	28	52	11	11
Oceania	240	176	179	145	155	3	2	1	1	1	2	2
Europe	605	1148	631	609	687	8	12	4	5	3	4	4
Total bilateral allocable by region	7515	9375	14458	13424	21605	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Least developed	1083	2226	4434	3480	4762	17	26	33	29	23	34	34
Other low-income	1431	1275	2096	1046	1246	22	15	16	9	6	19	19
Lower middle-income	3636	4431	6388	6972	13838	56	52	48	59	68	42	42
Upper middle-income	294	571	346	301	427	5	7	3	3	2	5	5
More advanced developing countries	1	0	0	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	0	0
Total bilateral allocable by income	6445	8503	13265	11800	20273	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>For reference:</i>												
<i>Total bilateral</i>	<i>9748</i>	<i>11979</i>	<i>17023</i>	<i>17138</i>	<i>25391</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>of which: Unallocated by region</i>	<i>2233</i>	<i>2604</i>	<i>2565</i>	<i>3714</i>	<i>3786</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>of which: Unallocated by income</i>	<i>3303</i>	<i>3475</i>	<i>3758</i>	<i>5338</i>	<i>5118</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>24</i>

share of funding to USAID carries risks, both because it is the most experienced government provider of aid and because it contains much of the US development expertise.⁵⁹

Conclusions

Discussions of the mobilising discourses surrounding the US WoT illustrate how the Bush administration employs the language associated with an emergent security-development nexus, which holds that in the context of globalisation and following the events of 11 September, there can be no security without development, and equally no development without security. The overriding objectives of the US administration with respect to Africa have in the main centred on the perceived imperatives stemming from aspirations to “win the ‘war on terror’ and ensure ‘homeland security’” – goals which have permeated not only its foreign policy strategies, but also informed its ODA. In many respects it has been the security of the US and the furtherance of its strategic objectives to secure access to oil that have taken precedence in the formulation of recent US ODA initiatives on the continent. Whilst there has been evidence of an employment of both hard and soft powers under the rubric of the WoT in Africa it is largely the former that have been in the ascendancy. Following recent US air strikes targeting al-Qaeda suspects in Somalia, launched from its anti-terror base in Djibouti, the US military presence in Africa has become highly visible. Such controversial projections of US military force are likely to bring its WoT in Africa under even greater scrutiny in the future.

The increased onus on international development objectives in the context of new concerns about global security may provide these with additional powers of leverage, which were not as much in evidence prior to the declaration of a WoT. Yet, in light of evidence it appears more likely that the US WoT has not succeeded in moving beyond narrow conceptions of security.⁶⁰ The UNDP *Human Development Report 2005* emphasised the negative potential consequences for African development that may result from a preoccupation with the WoT and as such sought to encourage states to reconceptualise security, arguing the “war against terror” will never be won unless *human* security, understood as “freedom from want and freedom from fear”, is extended and strengthened.⁶¹

Whilst there may be an inclination at times to conceive of international development trends as pre and post 11 September, or in this instance pre and post WoT, the US approach to Africa has displayed one essential continuity throughout. As Piciotto notes, US foreign assistance in the 1990s was largely about encouraging underdeveloped African countries to commit to free market-oriented policies. The logic informing this approach held that the trickle-down effects of economic growth facilitated by free trade would lead to poverty reduction in developing countries and also expand marketplaces for the industrial North.⁶² The Bush administration's solutions to African poverty within the context of its WoT are consistent with this approach in assessments that "free trade fights terrorism by promoting widespread prosperity".⁶³

It is clear the Bush administration links its fight against poverty and fight against terrorism with the extension of neo-liberal economic policies, through instruments like the MCA; whether such an approach is likely to advance adequately the prospects for sustainable and equitable pan-African development is less so. Hunt notes that the emphasis on eradicating poverty taken up by donors such as the US as a dimension of its WoT, is unwilling to challenge the virtues of neo-liberal globalisation or acknowledge that there may be contradictions between such poverty eradication goals and the widening inequality that current forms of neo-liberal globalisation are creating.⁶⁴

In its current configuration, the US WoT in Africa can be seen to be one characterised by the dominant US security response of policing global insecurity while making side-payments to select developing country governments, rather than promoting inclusion.⁶⁵ In 2007, the narrow notion of security promoted within US Africa policy and the sidelining of the more holistic concept of human security will continue to be confronted by the manifold development challenges Africa faces. This dichotomy may also illuminate the divide between African priorities and American imperatives on global threats.⁶⁶

Footnotes

- ¹ Lyman and Morrison (2004), p.3
- ² Obi (2005), p 38
- ³ George W. Bush quoted in Azam and Delacroix (2005), p. 1
- ⁴ Woods (2005), p.394
- ⁵ Beall et al. (2006), p.51
- ⁶ Lyman, et al. (2006), p.57
- ⁷ Beall et al. (2006), p.51

- ⁸ Ibid., p. 52
- ⁹ Bush (2001)
- ¹⁰ USAID (2006) p.5
- ¹¹ US General Wald, quoted in Keenan (2005), p.619
- ¹² Former US Assistant Secretary of State, Susan Rice, quoted in Carmody (2005) p.97
- ¹³ Wycoff (2004), p.2
- ¹⁴ US National Counterterrorism Center (2006), p.117
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p.171
- ¹⁶ Keenan (2005), p.621
- ¹⁷ Lyman et al. (2006), p.56
- ¹⁸ Obi (2005) p.39
- ¹⁹ Quoted in Azam and Delacroix (2005), p.1
- ²⁰ Kivimaki (2003), p.86. The debate surrounding the relationship between poverty and terrorism is longstanding. According to Kivimaki the evidence suggesting that economic deprivation is not a direct cause of terrorism is very strong and seems to be universal. He points out that in addition to the global statistical evidence, several Israeli experts and counterterrorism officials, who operate on the basis of data of personal histories of terrorists who have conducted operations in Israel, can also verify this. Also the interviews conducted by the author and several interviewers in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Sudan and Pakistan tend to confirm this. There is further supporting quantitative material of the Hezbollah terrorists and radical violent groups in Egypt: Kivimaki (2003), p.86. Yet, although there is no direct link between being poor and joining groups that use terrorist strategies to reach their goals, there are structural economic factors that may configure a potential climate for the eruption of diverse forms of political violence, including terrorism: unemployment, social injustice, a fast modernisation with its correlated sociological problems, all of which create a high degree of frustration. Poverty may contribute to a favourable climate for the emergence of terrorist groups as well as other forms of political violence. Another factor often employed by analysts to explain the causes of terrorism and develop new strategies is education. However, a study by Krueger and Maleckova underscores that any link between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak: Centro de Investigacion para la Paz, Conference Paper "Transnational terrorism: a debate on the causes and visions from the Arab world", Combating Terrorism and Protecting Democracy: The Role of Civil Society) accessed from <http://www.fuhem.es/cipresarch/pazysegnridad/thicuxsummaryenglish.pdf>
- ²¹ UNDP (2005), p.153; Patrick (2006), p.34
- ²² McCormack (2005), p.7
- ²³ Lyman et al. (2006) p.55
- ²⁴ US National Counterterrorism Center (2006), p.167
- ²⁵ *African Terrorism Bulletin* (2005), p.3
- ²⁶ Patrick (2006), p.34
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ US National Counterterrorism Center (2006), p.55
- ²⁹ Feickert (2005), p.7
- ³⁰ Wycoff (2004)
- ³¹ Black (2004)

- ³² Lyman et al. (2006), p.60
- ³³ Ibid. p.7
- ³⁴ Booker and Colgan (2006), p.3
- ³⁵ Carmody (2005), p.101; Ukeje (2005), p. 7
- ³⁶ Lyman et al. (2006), p.56
- ³⁷ New terrorism is often characterised as the unprecedented threat posed by Islamic extremists, with deontological motivations who exhibit a predilection for mass casualty attacks.
- ³⁸ Burnett and Whyte (2005), p.2
- ³⁹ Keenan (2005), p.619
- ⁴⁰ Ibid. p.639
- ⁴¹ Ellis (2004), p.463
- ⁴² Lyman et al. (2006), p.58
- ⁴³ In April 2005, amidst massive international public protest about crimes against humanity in Darfur, the CIA flew the senior Sudanese intelligence chief, Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh, who is thought to be seriously implicated in the Janjaweed militia campaign of violence against civilians in Darfur, to Washington for high-level consultations on its counterterrorism initiatives in the region: Lyman, et al. (2006), p.59.
- ⁴⁴ Carmody (2005), p.103
- ⁴⁵ Obi (2005), p.38
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p.39
- ⁴⁷ Omeje (2005), p.327
- ⁴⁸ Woods (2005), p.394
- ⁴⁹ OECD (2006), p. 46
- ⁵⁰ Soederberg (2004), p.279
- ⁵¹ Steinhilber (2004) p.5
- ⁵² Radlet (2003), p.57
- ⁵³ Carmody (2005), p.108
- ⁵⁴ Booker and Colgan (2006), p.3
- ⁵⁵ Commission for Africa (2005), p.229
- ⁵⁶ Howell (2006), 126
- ⁵⁷ Moss et al. (2005), p.14
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p.13
- ⁵⁹ OECD, 2006), p.12
- ⁶⁰ McDonald (2005), p.298
- ⁶¹ UNDP (2005), p.152
- ⁶² Beall et al. (2006), p.56
- ⁶³ Carmody (2005), p.105
- ⁶⁴ Kingsbury et al. (2004), p.82
- ⁶⁵ Carmody (2005) p.102
- ⁶⁶ Booker and Colgan (2006) p.9

References

- African Terrorism Bulletin* June 2005, Issue 003; accessed at <http://www.iss.org.za/Pubs/Newsletters/Terrorism/0305.htm#article0>
- Azam, J-P. and Delacroix, A. (2005), "Aid and the delegated fight against terrorism", *Review of Development Economics*, vol. 10, no. 2, May, pp.330-44; accessed at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2005/aid_delegated.pdf
- Beall, J. Goodfellow, T. and Putzel, J. (2006), "Introductory article: on the discourse of terrorism, security and development", *Journal of International Development*, vol. 18, pp.51-67
- Black, Cofer (2004), US Ambassador and Coordinator for Counterterrorism "The prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa", remarks at the Second Intergovernmental High-Level Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, Algeria, 13 October 2004; accessed at <http://www.stare.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2004/37230.htm>
- Booker, S and Colgan, A.L. (2006), paper for *Foreign Policy in Focus*, "Africa policy outlook 2006"; accessed at <http://www.fpiif.org/fpifxt/3157>
- Burnett, J. and Whyte, D. (2005), "Embedded expertise and the new terrorism", *Journal for Crime Conflict and the Media*, vol. 1, no. 4, pp.1-18
- Bush, George W. (2001), "US, Africa strengthen counter-terrorism and economic ties", remarks to the African Growth and Opportunity Forum, 29 October 2001; accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011029-2.html>
- Carmody, P. R. (2005), "Transforming globalization and security: Africa and America post-9/11", *Africa Today*, vol. 52, no.1, pp.97-120
- Commission for Africa (2005), *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*; accessed at <http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html>
- Dempsey, T. (2006), "Counterterrorism in African failed states: challenges and potential solutions", paper for the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, April 2006; accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=649>
- Ellis, S. (2004), "Briefing: the pan-Sahel initiative", *African Affairs* 103/412, pp 459-64
- Feickert, A. (2005), CRS Report for Congress, "US military operations in the global war on terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines and Colombia"; accessed at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32758.pdf>
- Howell, J. (2006), "The global war on terror, development and civil society", *Journal of International Development*, vol.18, pp.121-35
- International Crisis Group (2005), *Africa Report*, no.92, "Islamist terrorism in the Sahel: fact or fiction?"; accessed at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3349>
- Kansteiner, W. and Morrison, J. (2004), "Rising US stakes in Africa: seven proposals to strengthen US-Africa policy", paper for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); accessed at <http://allafrica.com/sustainable/resources/view/00010230.pdf>
- Keenan, J. (2005), "Waging war on terror: the implications of America's 'new imperialism' for Saharan peoples", *Journal of North African Studies*, vol.10, no.3-4, September-December 2005, pp.619-47
- Kingsbury, D., Remenyi, J., McKay, J. and Hunt, J. (2004), *Key Issues in Development*, Basingstoke: Palgrave
- Kivimaki, T. (ed., 2003), "Development cooperation as an instrument in the prevention of terrorism", Research Report by the Nordic Institute of Asian

- Studies (NIAS) for the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; accessed at <http://www.um.dk/en/servicemenu/Publications/DevelopmentPolicy/DevelopmentPreventionTerrorism.htm>
- Langton, D. (2006), CRS Issue Brief for Congress, "Africa-US foreign assistance issues"; accessed at <http://www.usembassy.ir/pdf/other/IB95052.pdf>
- Lyman, P., and Morrison, J. (2004), "The terrorist threat in Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, issue 1, January-February 2004, pp.75-86
- Lyman, P., Buche, R. and Morrison, J. (2006), "More than humanitarianism: a strategic US approach toward Africa", Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report No. 56; accessed at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Africa_Task_Force_Web.pdf
- Malan, M. (2002), "The post-9/11 security agenda and peacekeeping in Africa", *African Security Review*, vol. 11, no. 3
- McCormack, D. (2005), "An African vortex: radical Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa", Occasional Paper Series for Center for Security Policy, January 2005; accessed at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Af_Vortex.pdf
- McDonald, M. (2005), "Constructing insecurity: Australian security discourse and policy post-2001", *International Relations*, vol.19, no.3, pp 297-320
- Moss, T., Roodman, D. and Standley, S. (2005), "The global war on terror and US development assistance: USAID allocation by country, 1998-2005", Working Paper for the Center for Global Development, no.62, July 2005; accessed at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2863>
- Obi. C. (2005), "Oil, US security and the challenge of development in West Africa", *CODESRIA Bulletin*, nos. 3 and 4, pp.38-41
- OECD (2006), *United States (2006) DAC Peer Review: Main Findings and Recommendations*, accessed at http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_201185_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Omeje, K. (2005), "Oil conflict in Nigeria: conrending issues and local perspectives of the local Niger Delta people", *New Political Economy*, vol.10, no. 3, pp.321-34
- Patrick, S. (2006), "Weak states and global threats: fact or fiction?", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol.29, no.2, Spring 2006, pp.27-53
- Radlet, S. (2003), *Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account*, accessed from publishers Center for Global Development at <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2920>
- Rotberg, R. (2005), "The Horn of Africa and the Yemen – diminishing terrorism", in Rotberg, R. (ed., 2005), *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*; sample chapter accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/chapter_1/battlingterrorisminthehornofafrica.pdf
- Sagasti, F. (2005), "Official development assistance: background, context issues and prospects"; accessed from L-20 background papers at <http://www.l20.org/publications/Phase%20III/ODA/ODA%20Sagasti.pdf>
- Soederberg, S. (2004), "American empire and 'excluded states': the Millennium Challenge Account and the shift to pre-emptive development", *Third World Quarterly*, vol.25, no.2, pp.279-302
- Steinhilber, J. (2004), "Millennium Challenge Account: goals and strategy of US development policy", a Friedrich Eber Stiftung briefing paper; accessed at http://www.fesny.org/docus/peacesec/millennium_challenge_account.pdf

- Ukeje, C. (2005), "Rethinking Africa's security in the age of uncertain globalization: NEPAD and human security in the 21st century", paper submitted to the 11th CODESRIA General Assembly on the theme "Rethinking African development: beyond impasse, towards alternatives", Maputo, Mozambique, 6-10 December, 2005; accessed at http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/general_assembly11/papers/ukeje.pdf
- UNDP (2005), *Human Development Report 2005 – International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid Trade and Security in an Unequal World*; accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf
- USAID (2002), *Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity*, accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/fani/Full_Report—Foreign_Aid_in_the_National_Interest.pdf
- USAID (2006), *Policy Framework for Bilateral Foreign Aid: Implementing Transformational Diplomacy through Development*, accessed at <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/updates/iu2-0602a.pdf>
- US National Counterterrorism Center (2006), *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*; accessed at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c17689.htm>
- Woods, N. (2005), "The shifting politics of foreign aid", *International Affairs*, vol. 82, no.1 pp.393-409
- Wycoff, Karl (2004), US Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Fighting terrorism in Africa", testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Africa, Washington DC, 1 April 2004; accessed at <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/tm/2004/31077.htm>