Trócaire Development Review, Dublin, 1991, pp. 57-71, ISSN 0790-9403

Bananas and '1992': the Battle to Preserve Protected Trade from the Caribbean

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Banana trade between the Caribbean and Europe has a history which goes back to the turn of the century; but that trade is now under threat of extinction as a result of the European Community's drive to complete the Internal Market after 1992. This article begins by providing a brief history of the trade in bananas between the Caribbean and the EC (principally the UK), and the benefits and disbenefits this trade has had for the Caribbean. The structure of the banana market in Europe is examined, the existence of protected trade to compensate for the Caribbean's higher production costs is explored, and the warning signs that a problem with this protectionism was imminent are indicated. The article concludes with a description of the current political difficulties which attend the attempts to establish a common trade regime for bananas in Europe which would allow for the survival of the Caribbean industry, and the responses to the problem by various Member States.

Banana production in the Caribbean region – a mixed basket

Bananas are an excellent example of the cash crop in both a theoretical and a practical sense. Offering advantages to the grower and the exporter in many ways, they nonetheless have disbenefits, both intrinsically by dint of the banana's natural characteristics, and also extrinsically in the way that the trade has bound several states in the Caribbean into a dependency on Western markets which has left their economies extremely vulnerable to the complex politics of international trade bargaining. Compelling arguments exist both for the maintenance of the banana trade and for irs abandonment.

As a crop, bananas are not in fact indigenous to the Caribbean. They were introduced with the first white colonists, but it was not until the turn of the century that the first Jamaican bananas were brought by the Fyffes company to Europe. Their cultivation was encouraged by the UK after the Second World War on the back of rising demand for fresh fruit at cheap prices; Geest Industries signed the first contract to bring bananas from the Windward Islands in the early 50s. Fyffes and Geest are now the two leading importers of Caribbean bananas into the UK, with Jamaica Producers making up the remainder. Fyffes is an Irish-based fruit importer and re-exporter, while Geest is predominantly UK based. The majority of the bananas are ripened by the major companies before being sold on through their own distribution networks.

A major advantage of the trade for the UK was that the post-colonial circumstances of the Caribbean allowed for payment for the fruit in sterling, a factor which added considerably to the attraction. Given that the pre-independence UK territories in the Caribbean were still using sterling as their currency, Britain was able to avoid spending its foreign reserves in the period immediately after the Second World War. This had obvious long-term advantages for the UK economy since the Caribbean remained in the 'sterling area' until the mid-70s. Undoubtedly, though, there were reasons for both sides of the Caribbean banana trade to want it to increase, providing as it did cheap fruit for the British market and a ready source of income for the Caribbean.

Growers in the Caribbean have good reasons to be keen on bananas as a crop; foremost of these is that they are almost unique as an agricultural commodity because they can be harvested all year round, and are, as such, perpetually 'in season'. Requiring no fertilisation, there is a continuous cycle of new shoots emerging, fruit appearing and being harvested, and the plant being cut back. The short growing cycle ensures continuous returns to the grower all year round, rather than a single yearly yield.

The majority of banana production in the Caribbean is by small growers, either owner farmers or tenants, and these individuals exert a considerable degree of influence over their own futures through the producer associations WINBAN and JAMCO. The protected nature of the market for Caribbean bananas in the UK (see below) has ensured that over the last forty years bananas have remained an attractive crop for cultivation.

But there is a downside to banana growing. The disadvantage which is most often mentioned is that as a non-indigenous crop, bananas encourage cultivation practices which are out of keeping with the best interests of the Caribbean environment. Bananas consume land, and this has led to some environmental damage. There has been a considerable drive for competitiveness in recent years, engendered by the appearance of strong competition from the 'dollar' area (see below), encouraged by Caribbean politicians, and accelerated by the UK Government's recent review of banana policy. This extra competitiveness has had a knock-on effect on the environment.

A recent Oxfam Report[1] cited Earlene Horne, General Secretary of the National Farmers' Union in St Vincent as saying:

> Banana is killing us, not only financially but socially. If you add it up, it's just not profitable. Banana need a lot of land – the more you grow it, the more you need, so farmers are cutting down the forests to produce more. Bananas have brought us a range of chemicals over the years that are killing us. The plastic used to cover the banana to protect them do not rot easy and there's no way of getting rid of it. In our rivers there used to be fish but they've all gone, not just because the amount of plastic that has been washed into them, but bananas are often grown on slopes near rivers and streams and chemicals sprayed onto the crop run into the water.
>
> They tell us overhead aerial spraying is harmless but we're beginning to see a number of our birds disappearing. If we weigh it all up we realise banana is doing us a lot of harm.

Bananas are also highly vulnerable to storm damage, as Hurricane Gilbert made horrifyingly clear. The tree, which is almost rootless, is simply not adapted to harsh conditions, and interruption to trade in this way is a constant headache for the industry and for economic planners, though the quick growing cycle of the tree means at least that production can be restored within a year.

Finally though, the heavy reliance of some Caribbean economies on the banana industry must in itself be seen as the industry's most serious disadvantage. Undoubtedly this dependence has owed something to the successful marketing of the product by growers' associations and to a recognition that bananas can produce very reasonable returns; but it can also be argued that the protected nature of the current banana market regimes operated by several EC member states has lulled the Caribbean into a cash-crop dependency which would have no future if that protected status were to be removed.

Whatever the case, it is certain that banana cultivation plays an important part in the economies of the Caribbean nations. In Jamaica, bananas are perhaps secondary to tourism and other aetivities as income generators, but in Eastern Caribbean states they are the single biggest sources of wealth creation; in Dominica for example, they account for some 60% of total exports. The banana trade also has economic benefits peripheral to the trade itself; in the Windward Islands everything centres on the banana trade, and on the bi-monthly visits of the banana boat. The reliability of regular visits to the islands by the banana boat has meant that communications are guaranteed, and that there is the possibility of viable exporting of smaller volumes of other produce to Europe. If the banana trade were to fail, that facility, and similar spin-off benefits, would be likely to evaporate.

Protection of banana markets in Europe

The Caribbean is not, of course, the only area of the world in which bananas are grown. The four geographic regions of global production are African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, the 'dollar banana' region[2] (Latin and Central America), EC Overseas Departments and Territories, and Asia and Oceania. Table 1 shows the spread of world production:

Table 1: World banana production in 1988	('000 tons)
'Dollar' area	5,545
ACP	550[3]
EC Overseas Departments	753
Asia and Oceania	1,038
Total	7,885

Source: FAO[4]

The following are the banana-producing countries in each region:

'Dollar'	Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Brazil
ACP	Belize, Jamaica, Surinam, Windward Islands, the Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Somalia
EC Overseas	Madeira (Portugal), Canaries (Spain), Guadeloupe (France), Martinique (France)
Asia etc.	Philippines

The Philippines do not have an export presence in Europe. The proportions of trade into the EC are approximately: EC Overseas Dominions and Territories 25%, ACP 20%, and 'Dollar' 50% plus.

Of these, the 'dollar' fruit are *significantly* cheaper in terms of producer prices, as Table 2 for the UK indicates:

Table 2: Structure of retail price of bananas in the UK, 1990[5]

	ACP p/lb	Dollar p/lb
Producer cost ('FOB')	15.9[6]	12.1
Landed value ('CIF')	20.8	19.2
Wholesale price	29.0	30.8
Retail price	51.8	51.8

The first question this begs is what causes this differential in producer price. The answer lies in a combination of climatic, geographical, and topographical advantages for Latin America, and in simple economies of scale. The plantations in the 'dollar' region are very large (anything up to 5,000 hectares), spread over much flatter land than is available in the Caribbean, with good soil and generally a much higher level of mechanisation than elsewhere. In almost all Latin American countries the plantations are under the indirect control of the multinationals, allowing vertical integration and cost-cutting.

Finally though, there is some suggestion that the success of Latin American banana production comes at the expense of the people of the region. Labour costs there are generally lower than in the Caribbean, and one recent report suggested that

> . . . part of the cost advantage enjoyed by dollar bananas stems directly from repressive working conditions and low

wages on many of the plantations. During pay negotiations in Colombia for example in 1987, over 200 people – mainly union leaders and plantation workers – were killed in the banana-growing region of Uraba.[7]

Even were wages to rise in the area, the other factors would still conspire to make it highly unlikely that the Caribbean could ever expect to compete successfully with large 'dollar' producers; the same is true of EC producers. (Other ACP countries such as Somalia and the Cameroon can probably come to compete aggressively with Latin America in the future.)

The second question that arises is how a common price is arrived at for both ACP and 'dollar' fruit on the shelves of UK retailers. It is hard to illuminate this process, but it probably is as a result of action both by the importers and the multiple retailers. By the time the banana is on the shop shelves it is quite difficult to determine its point of origin. Sometimes bananas will carry origin stickers, but mostly they will be unmarked. Most outlets are thus not compelled to differentiate in retail price between the different sources. That this is so presents a powerful incentive to the large chains to favour supplies from the 'dollar' region, as their margin is thus greater. (The argument that a free market in banana supplies to the UK would result in reduced prices to the consumer loses some of its force as a result of this point, as will be discussed below.)

The third question is how Caribbean (and similar EC) production has managed to survive if it is uncompetitive; it is apparent that the Latin American producers could gear up relatively easily to take the whole of the European market if it became available, in the same way that they currently control the whole of the North American market, and are poised to take Eastern Europe as it opens up.

The answer is the protective trade regimes operated by several EC Member States. In political rhetoric, the motivation for these regimes is the fostering of economic development in Caribbean LDCs. An element of post-colonial guilt is present though, and the fact that any protected market provides the possibility of good profits (for either the importer, the wholesaler, or both) at the expense of the consumer may also have been a contributory factor. Whatever the truth, the bilateral arrangements have led to flourishing industries, but also to precisely the sort of dependency culture discussed earlier.

The UK, France and Italy all operate some form of restricted market in bananas, by combinations of quota/licence systems reducing the imports of cheaper 'dollar' fruit, and tariffs designed to raise that fruit's price. Greece, Spain and Portugal all have arrangemenrs which protect their domestic producers, while the remaining Member States operate open markets.

Protection of trade between ACP countries and the EC is governed by the Lomé Convention, first signed in 1976 as a successor to the Yaoundé Convention. Among Lomé's specific guarantees was a Protocol relating to the banana trade. The Banana Protocol of the Convention states specifically with regard to bananas that 'no ACP State shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets and its advantages on those markets, in a less favourable situation than in the past or at the present.'[8] This guarantee has been reflected in UK Government utterances; in July 1987 in Jamaica, the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, stated the position thus: 'We shall continue to fight hard in the European Community . . . to make sure that Jamaica and other Caribbean countries go on enjoying the preferential arrangements for . . . bananas under the Lomé Convention.'[9]

These guarantees have always been interpreted as referring to existing markets within Member States, and thus would imply the continuance of protected trading arrangements at a Member State level.

The 1992 problem?

All this might therefore seem well and good; the ACP countries continue to have a guaranteed market for bananas in the UK and the Latin Americans continue to take the lion's share in the other Member States. However, the first suggestions of a problem were as long ago as the mid-70s, when it was mooted that the guarantees given under Lomé might in fact be contrary to certain articles of the Treaty of Rome, which governs the European Community. Arguments for protected trade have always relied on Article 115 of the Treaty, which allows the Commission to permit a Member State to restrict free entry of goods from other Member States if those goods in fact originate in a 'third country' and where the shipment of those goods would circumvent quota arrangements. But there has always been a legal opinion that Lomé's provisions are contrary to the basic goals of the Community, set out in Article 2 of the Treaty, which seek the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports between Member States, and the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries.[10] There have also been persistent claims that Lomé is outside the spirit of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT).

Whatever the legality of Lomé's guarantees under the Treaty of Rome or GATT, it was readily apparent that they ran directly counter to the primary policy drift of the '1992' programme for the completion of the internal market. The very basis of 1992 is that Member States cede the right to have individual, bilateral arrangements for trade at a national level. These bilateral trading arrangements have themselves only been possible under the Treaty of Rome because of the use of Article 115 of the Treaty, and under the terms of the Single Market such exceptions will be unenforceable. The priorities for 1992, set out in a Commission White Paper of 1985,[11] are to remove technical, fiscal and physical barriers to the movement of goods, services, people and capital in the EC. This would logically apply to the currently restricted banana trade; and the notion of barrier-free circulation in the European market was immediately seen by the ACP as spelling doom for their higher-cost banana exports.

Development of the lobby for continuance of protected trade

From the moment that the Single European Act became a reality and the Commission published its 1992 objectives it was apparent that the ACP countries had a very considerable job facing them to argue for exceptions to 1992 on the basis of traditional trade of high economic and political importance.

The task seen as most significant by the lobby was in a sense a sly one; the guarantees given in Lomé are successively renewed, with Lomé II being signed in 1980, and Lomé III in 1985. The decision of the lobby was to preempt any change to existing banana regimes by the 1992 process by looking for a verbatim renewal of the Banana Protocol in Lomé IV (1989) before the clash with the 1992 objectives had received any political attention. This was achieved; but Lomé is only a 'convention'; the next goal was to ensure that these guarantees, hardly enforceable under international law, were nonetheless made the subject of considerable political assurances within Europe in order to minimise the chance that they could be abandoned completely.

Since 1989, there has been a great deal of political maneouvering on what has become known simply as the 'banana problem'. Widely recognised as one of the most difficult dossiers of the 1992 programme, it must eventually be solved by regulation of some description at the European level. So far though, the European Commission's banana working group has been simply unable to find a formula which can balance the imperatives of 1992, the pressure for free markets from some Member States and from Latin America, the desire for non-intervention by some others, and the needs of the ACP and EC producers. Proposals for a post-1992 regime have yet even to appear in draft.

Despite the failure of the Commission to put forward an opinion, the grass has not been growing under Member States' feet. Several have already expressed themselves of views in some shape or form.

Member states' suggestions, the EC, the ACP, and Latin America

Proposals for a 'solution' to the banana problem have varied considerably in tone. At one end of the spectrum, the Benelux countries, whose consumers currently enjoy an entirely free market, have expressed themselves jointly in a document[12] which strongly opposes any protected market in Europe as being out of character with the 1992 ideal. The paper states that

> The preservation of the status quo is unacceptable . . .
>
> The expansion of quantitative import restrictions[13] meets with serious objections . . .
>
> A system of minimum import prices[14] . . . would be at the expense of traditional suppliers (Central and South America) . . . and at the expense of EC consumers who would be presented with the bill.
>
> . . . Benelux has come to the conclusion that the only acceptable regulation, on the basis of the obligations for free trade after 1992, is an unlimited quantitative import of bananas to the common market with uniform rules for import from other countries at the external borders. Regional

safeguard measures based on Article 115 of the EEC Treaty should no longer be allowed.

This last condition is almost a definition of the free market position. The stiff nature of the Benelux countries' opposition to protection for banana trade of any form is no doubt sincere; but the position paper is so extreme that it must be considered an unrealistic bargaining position for further negotiations at a European level.

At the other end of the scale the French Government has proposed a complex system of quotas, tariffs and levies which would seek to preserve the industries of the ACP and of EC overseas producers.[15] The monies raised by the levies and tariffs would be used to fund diversification and development in these regions.

The paper begins with a direct statement of the importance of the problem 'Without the banana economy the Antilles[16] would lose 15,000 direct lobs, 30,000 indirect jobs, and 50 per cent of the total value of their exports, as well as experiencing a crisis of maritime transport. There is no significant potential for a substitute agricultural economy.'

The following principles for protective mechanisms were proposed:

- The principle of respecting Community preference
- The principle of long term guarantees for the consumer
- Regulation by means of a pricing system is as important as regulation by a quota system
- The system to be built must involve a balancing of expenditure and resources for the Community budget
- The system must harmonise the interests of producers from the Community with the interests of the ACP and non-member countries.[17]

These principles are of course a useful working definition of the problem to be solved, but they add precious little to the current debate. However, the paper goes on to make very specific recommendations about the shape of an acceptable regulation:

- Application of the standard 20%[18] external tariff to all banana imports from non-member countries
- Application of a levy at an economically reasonable level[19] to all bananas from non-EC sources
- Application of a quantitative ceiling,[20] expressed as a market share, to non-member countries' bananas.

The French envisage that the customs duties (tariffs) collected under this system might be used to assist EC producers in the form of income support, while the revenue from the levy would be used to encourage diversification in non-European banana producing countries.

The ACP Working Group in Brussels has made its position clear in a memorandum of November 1990. It is remarkably similar to the French position. It seeks a combination of import restrictions on bananas from 'dollar' sources combined with price mechanisms which would inflate the dollar price towards that of ACP and EC fruit. Though perhaps differing in the detail, it is reasonable to assume that the Spanish and Portuguese Governments will share the French view; but it is clear that the European Commission is not greatly enthused by the prospect of the complicated, CAP-style price support measures that the French propose.

Sitting uncomfortably in the middle is 1990s Britain. The genesis of current UK thinking was in the non-interventionist 80s. The appearance of a set of UK Ministry of Agriculture 'discussion papers',[21] exploring the idea of a restrictive quota on 'dollar' banana imports into the Community without actually committing the UK Government to anything concrete probably represents one of Whitehall's finest hours. The nature of the papers is technical rather than political, and does not bear discussion here; but that the Ministry was able to get this mildly interventionist proposal (even in its hypothetical state) past its somewhat hawk-like sister ministries is worthy of note. In the end though, and with a change of leader in the UK, there is a growing feeling in UK political circles that more will need to be done. The UK has, of course, a large Caribbean presence, and although this has not yet been a vociferous lobby this could happen. A change toward more interventionist politics generally in the UK is perhaps beginning.

Many analysts are now of the view that the battle for some form of protection, perhaps transitional, has been won, both in the UK, and indeed in the Commission, which is now actively working to produce some set of compromise proposals. The argument moves to much more technical issues: how to deliver the protection, and in what degree?

Two ideas, bare in detail, seem to represent current thinking in the European Commission, which after all will have the first go at a formal solution. Both differ quite radically from the mechanistic approaches set out in the various Member State proposals. The first, and perhaps less likely, involves asking the

Latin Americans to reorganise their trade so that the producer associations would hold licence to the export of their own fruit. They could thus choose to place their exports with the company making the highest bid rather than necessarily sticking to their traditional partners in the multinationals. The resultant auction would supposedly force the price of 'dollar' bananas up towards that of ACP fruit, removing the need for further protection.

The second option, and the one more likely to be practicable, is that of *jumelage*, or twinning. Here, there would be a simple obligation on importers of 'dollar' fruit into the EC to import ACP fruit in a direct relationship – most likely one for one. This would ensure the continuance of a market for the ACP. Already though, officials are questioning the validity of such arrangements under the GATT.

These somewhat esoteric trading arrangements may come to exist on their own or as part of a package which includes levy and quota arrangements envisaged by the ACP countries; but though not yet espoused in written form, the views of the free-market Germans, and indeed of the increasingly organised Latin American lobby can not be discounted. Proposals from the European Commission have been awaited eagerly since the start of 1990, but it surely can not be long now before they are unveiled, and the close-quarter fighting of the European legislative process gets under way.

Ireland's rôle

Ireland finds itself with arguments for both sides of the debate. On the one hand, it is clear that Ireland has a greater commitment than most member states to the developing world. This does not necessarily add up to a belief in the need to preserve protected trade, as the normally developmental Dutch are currently demonstrating with their free-trade approach to the banana issue; equally, a national commitment to the developing world as a whole could be seen as a good reason not to discriminate against the Latin Americans and in favour of the Caribbean.

More importantly perhaps, Ireland is well placed to understand the difficulties that post-colonial nations must endure in trading with large economic blocs. There are several obvious parallels to be observed between the Caribbean situation and the Irish experience, not the least of which is that between the drastic effects which small growers would feel in the Caribbean if protected trade were removed, and the fears of Irish small farmers about their prospects under wholesale reform of the CAP and the removal of agricultural support. For these reasons the Caribbean might hope for some sympathy in Ireland.

On the other hand, Ireland currently has no protected trade with the ACP in bananas, and takes its fruit primarily from Latin America. Any protective regime established at the European level which tried to give some form of guaranteed price to the ACP could thus be likely to raise prices for the fruit to the consumer within Ireland, causing disquiet and adding to the rate of inflation. However, Ireland does have access to fruit from both sources, and retail prices are not much below those in the UK, so it may be that a significant price rise would not occur under a new pan-European arrangement.

Ireland does also have a good economic reason to argue for some form of protection for the Caribbean, given that Fyffes, traditional importers of Jamaican bananas to the UK, is owned by Fruit Importers of Ireland (FII), one of the country's largest commercial concerns. This can cause some confusion, since Ireland itself does not take any Caribbean bananas. Fyffes is essentially involved in re-exporting Jamaican bananas to the UK; but the so-called 'banana war' which Fyffes fought with the multinational Chiquita over the last two years has recently been settled, with Fyffes bringing bananas from the Dominican Republic (a new member of the ACP group, but not a beneficiary of traditional protected trade status) and Honduras to Irish and other European shores. The 'war' in Honduras saw extraordinary scenes of private security guards imposing a court order in Puerto Cortes by unloading an entire 52,000 box boatful of bananas which had been sold to Fyffes despite an 'exclusive' sales contract between Promexh, the Honduran export company and Chiquita. The bananas were then pulped. Considerable argument had raged over Fyffes' attempt to buy Honduran produce at prices some 50% above those normally offered by Chiquita. The accession of the Dominican Republic (DR) to the ACP group of states was also the source of great rancour, as it was achieved initially with an agreement that the DR would not attempt to access the preferential banana market in parts of Europe existing under the Lomé Convention. The DR announced last year its intention to ship $25m worth of bananas to Europe in an arrangement with Fyffes. An uneasy truce was eventually reached when the DR agreed not to export to the UK, but only to other member states. Both of these cases indicate an attempt by Fyffes to broaden its sourcing of fruit in the run up to 1 January 1993, given the uncertainty over the future of the Caribbean supply.

It is important that Ireland should take a view on the banana problem. Settlement of the issue is likely to be subject to the new 'qualified majority' procedures in the European Council of Ministers, and given the line-up so far, Ireland's small number of votes may well be critical in determining whether protected trade from the Caribbean can continue.

Conclusions

First, the banana industries of the Caribbean have served the region moderately well. Despite some unsuitability and ecological damage, they have helped to provide a steady flow of earnings to the area, and have induced a modest amount of investment in skills and infrastructure.

Second, it should be apparent that the 1992 banana issue is a cruelly accurate picture of how the interests of the developing world can be lost in the larger tide of political events in the developed world. The 1992 process was not designed to scupper the commerce of LDCs; but neither was there sufficient exploration made of the profound effects that European economic integration was likely to have on them.

Third, the banana industries of the Caribbean are unlikely to have a long term viability. With the natural advantages they possess, the Latin Americans are ultimately set to win out. This means that the European Community faces a medium and a long term problem of political expediency. Medium term, how can it maintain some form of protected status for the ACP during the lifetime of the present Lomé Convention; long term can it find a viable product into which ACP effort can be diversified? Both these goals are fraught with considerable political difficulty.

Footnotes

1. Neil MacDonald, (1990), *The Caribbean – Making Our Own Choices*, London, Oxfam.
2. The term 'dollar' banana, originally a trade term, has achieved conventional acceptance as political language for fruit from the Latin American area.
3. Of which 363,000 tons are produced by the Caribbean region.
4. Quoted in Fitzpatrick and Associates, (1990), *Trade Policy and the EC Banana Market*, Dublin.

5. Source: *Banana Price/Margin Monitoring*, compiled monthly by the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Tropical Foods Division.
6. This figure is essentially an average of Caribbean producer costs rather than those in the full ACP.
7. Ed Mayo, (1990), *1992 – European Wealth, Third World Poverty?*, World Development Movement and the Socialist Group of the European Parliament
8. Protocol 4, *Third ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lomé*, and published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. The text of Protocol 4 was renewed verbatim as Protocol 5 of Lomé IV.
9. Souree: the UK Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Tropieal Foods Division.
10. For a fuller, legal discussion of these objections see Community Trade Advisers, (1990), *Trade Policy and the EC Banana Market – A Legal Analysis*, Brussels.
11. *Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council*, COM (85) 310 of 14 June 1985.
12. Memorandum of the Governments of the Three Benelux Couutries, published in September 1990 by the Benelux Economie Union's Commission for Foreign Eeonomic Relations.
13. This would presumably cover the sort of quota system envisaged by the UK in its discussion papers (see later).
14. Such as a variable levy or some system involving a target price.
15. These views were set out in the text of a speech by M. Le Pensec, French Minister for the Overseas Dominions and Territories in January 1991.
16. The Antilles region comprises both ACP territories and French DOMs (overseas territories)
17. Effectively 'dollar' area producers in this case
18. Since Germany currently has no tariff at all imposed on bananas while 20% prevails as a tariff in other parts of the Community, a Community-wide tariff of 20% would effectively mean an overall *increase* in the level of direct protection in bananas, and would thus almosr certainly be unacceptable under the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
19. Likely to be small enough not to worry the Caribbean.
20. A strange version of volume control whieh would be fixed by percentage marketshare rather than by total volume
21. *Bananas: Common Arrangements Based Upon a Quota on Imports from* , the UK Minisrry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, March and November 1990.